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knowledge' (PN3: 8). It may therefore be viewed as a defender of REASON, which leads,
via the removal of obstacles to its exercise, in the direction of FREEDOM. Like any
cognitive process, it is irreducibly normative (see INTRINSIC/EXTRINSIC).
Both distinct from and interconnected with other practices (indeed internal to the
subject-matter of the social sciences, though not of the natural), then, philosophy may
be said to be in constellational or dialectical UNITY with them, under the sign of the
'relative primacy' (SR: 236 n) of science broadly understood. In the case of m ethod, for
example, just as there can be no discourse on method in abstraction from the sciences,
so there can be no science in abstraction from the possibility of a critical discussion of
its method. This is the methodologi,cal circle, twin-screwing philosophy and science' (SR:
19). In delineating the general contours of the categorial structure of the world - to take
another example - philosophy illumines the AXIOLOGICAL NECESSITY informing
the particular practices of everyday life, thereby promoting self-conscious
understanding of what we are doing in our activities. Since its fundamental procedure
is immanent critique, CR philosophy has nothing in common with the speculative
illusion. This is in no way incompatible with conjecture which, in an effort to break
decisively with the philosophy of the status quo, is increasingly resorted to in the later
works.
For the CR account and critique of philosophy as it has been practised in the
West, whose real definition is 'the janus-faced {progressive/regressive, rational/
rationalising} aporetic and generally unconscious normalisation of the status quo ante'
(P. 216), see EMPIRICISM, IDEALISM, IDENTITY THEORY, IRREALISM, PROBLEM,
RATIONALISM, PDM, VALENCE (ontological monovalence), together with crossreferences.
philosophy, problems of See PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY.
philosophy ofhistory. See FUTURES STUDIES; GEO-HISTORICITY; HISTORIOGRAPHY; and DCR passim.
philosophy of identity. See IDENTITY.
philosophy oflaw. See LEGAL STUDIES.
philosophy of meta-Reality. See META-REALITY.
philosophy of mind. See MIND.
philosophy ofreligion. The branch of philosophy that addresses questions such as:
Does God exist? What can we know about.God? What is the relationship between
God and nature, and between God and human beings? What in general is the status
of religious language, belief and practice? Is religious belief compatible with science?
Materialist world views that accompanied the rise of modem science tended not to
allow any place for God and to portray religious convictions as simply false and religious
practices as relics of the 'unenlightened' past. Some more recent philosophical
viewpoints, however, have denied that religious claims can be considered to express
either truths or falsehoods. Logical POSITIVISM, for example, drawing on the
verification theory of meaning, portrayed religious claims not so much as false, but as
unverifiable and therefore meaningless. In contrast, post-Wittgensteinian approaches
consider them to be meaningful in virtue of being part of a coherent LANGUAGEGAME, but one in which assertions of truth (or falsity) do not occur. Prayerful
invocations of God, e.g. , do not presuppose the truth of God's existence or of any
religious tradition's doctrines about how God relates with human beings. Instead they
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serve social functions, such as calling on a community to centre itself or to remember
its own best nature. Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-72) held something like this view as well
when he argued that religious claims should not be judged in the same way as scientific
ones.
These approaches notwithstanding, much philosophy of religion proceeds in a realist
vein, inquiring, e.g., whether or not there are good reasons to accept that God really
exists or that the doctrines of any religious traditions can claim the status of truth.
Thomistic philosophy is a case in point; it is well known for its defence of the 'five ways',
five 'proofs' of the existence of God, proposed by St Thomas Aquinas (1224-74) (Kenny
1981 ). From a different perspective, connected with its rejection of reductive
metaphysical materialism and of positivism, CR also provides justification for
proceeding in this vein. The recent spiritual turn in CR, taken by many people
associated with Roy Bhaskar (EW, SE, RM; see also Hartwig 200 l ), illustrates that CR
can provide a friendly context for entertaining religious views. Long before Bhaskar's
spiritual turn, however, the physicist and philosopher of religion Ian Barbour (1966)
used the phrase 'critical realism' to describe a philosophical position, distinct from
NAIVE REALISM, which denied that there is immediate access to the world as it is in
itself. At the same time, in contrast with idealist thought, Barbour's CR affirmed a
world ontologically independent of human observation, which, moreover, humans
could know under fallible, historically conditioned descriptions - and, for Barbour, it
remains an open question whether or not this world may contain religious realities.
Barbour's variety of CR remained little elaborated, and almost unknown among those
who have used the term 'critical realism' to label the more elaborated philosophical
position developed by Rom Harre and Bhaskar (Porpora 200 I a; Shipway 2000, 2002).
For a long time, the latter version of CR had its greatest influence in the social
sciences - particularly the line advanced by Bhaskar, which in some ways can be
considered an articulation of the philosophy of science implicit in Marxist thought.
From this perspective, it may seem ironic that CR has recently made a spiritual turn.
It is a turn, however, that has been accompanied by a reassessment of Marx as a
spiritual thinker, and one that makes it possible to interpret CR, not in a purely secular
way, but in a way that provides insight into the possibility of truth in religion.
There are various, divergent lines of argument associated with the spiritual turn in
CR. Bhaskar (D, EW, SE, 2002d, e) himselfhas argued that CR by itself is incomplete,
that it needed to be supplemented first by dialectics - dialectical critical realism (DCR)
- and ultimately by considerations of transcendence - transcendental dialectical critical
realism (TDCR) and the philosophy of META-REALITY (PMR). In his most recent
writings, TDCR and PMR incorporate many principles from Hinduism; PMR aspires
to articulate a position 'within the bounds of secularism, consistent with all faiths and
no faith' (RM: 93). In contrast, Margaret Archer, Andrew Collier and Douglas Porpora
together advance a position, more in the spirit of Barbour, that CR is a philosophy of
science more hospitable to religious truth claims than either positivism or postWittgensteinian philosophy, but that it does not in and of itself offer any way to
adjudicate among those claims (Archer, Collier and Porpora 2004; Collier 2001a,
2003a; Porpora 200lc). These critical realists have offered important accounts of the
nature of religious experience and its epistemic significance. Additional work on CR
and religion has followed. Porpora (2003) and Hugh Lacey (2003a), e.g., have explored
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affinities between CR and liberation theology that derive from their common interest
in EMANCIPATORY PRACTICES, and A. E. McGrath (2001, 2002, 2003) has used
Bhaskar's CR as the philosophical underpinning of a major theological treatise
(Shipway 2004). See also GEOGRAPHY OF RELIGION; IDEALISM vs. MATERIALISM.
HUGH LACEY, DoUGIAS V. PORPORA
philosophy of science. The branch of philosophy that deals with philosophical and
foundational problems that arise within science. It can be divided into two major
strands. The one may be called general philosophy of science (or methodology), while
the other comprises philosophies of the individual sciences (physics, biology,
psychology, economics, etc.). Since the object of general philosophy of science is science
in general, its central target is to understand science as cognitive activity. Some of the
central questions that have arisen and been thoroughly discussed are: What is the aim
and method of science? What makes it a rational activity? What rules govern theorychange in science? What constitutes success in science? How do scientific theories relate
to the world? How are concepts formed and how are they related to observation? What
is the structure and content of major scientific concepts, such as causation, explanation,
confirmation, theory, experiment, model, reduction and so on?
These kinds of questions were originally addressed within a formal logicomathematical framework, which culminated with the school of logical EMPIRICISM.
The central thought of this school was that philosophy of science should be seen as the
logi,c ef science: the logical-syntactic structure of the basic concepts of science should
be laid bare so that their conditions of application should be transparent and
intersubjectively valid. Taking a cue from David Hilbert's (1862- 1943) formalist
approach to mathematics, the logical empiricists aimed at a rational reconstruction of
scientific theories as formal axiomatic systems. But, being empiricists, and influenced
by the French CONVENTIONALIST philosophers Pierre Duhem (1861- 1916) and
Henri Poincare (1854-1912), they took theories to be systems of hypotheses whose
ultimate aim was to save the empirical phenomena. The central problem that then
arose concerned the status of theoretical terms, that is, of terms which, on the face of
it, purport to refer to unobservable entities and events. Logical empiricists favoured the
possibility of strict verification by observation as the criterion of meaningfulness, but
they soon liberalised it, as it led to the absurd conclusion that most scientific assertions
(including empirical generalisations) are meaningless. However, the logical empiricists
remained committed to the view that a central task of philosophy of science was to show
how a priori knowledge was possible and to separate the analytic (or conceptual) from
the synthetic (or factual-empirical) content of scientific theories. Concomitant with this
view was the thought that philosophy of science itself is a largely a priori conceptual
enterprise aiming to reconstruct the language of science. Following Gottlob Frege
(1848- 1925), such thinkers rejected psychologism (or naturalism) in favour of
justificationism, viz. , the view that the target of philosophy of science is to lay down
criteria as to how scientists ought to reason, what kind of methods they ought to use
and what content the basic scientific concepts ought to have . Consequently, they
sharply separated the context ef discovery from the context ifjustification. This project
culminated in Rudolf Carnap's (1891 - 1970) attempt to devise a formal system of
inductive logic and in Carl Hempel's (1905- 97) deductive-nomological model of

